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**In a Fortnight**

By Joseph E. Lin

CHINA AND INDIA TO CONDUCT FIRST-EVER JOINT ARMY EXERCISES

Indian Army Chief of Staff General Joginder Jaswant Singh, having recently returned from a week-long visit to China, announced that Delhi and Beijing would hold their very first joint army exercise in October. The exercise, in which 100 Indian soldiers will be sent to China, will be centered on conducting counter-terrorist operations (PTI News Agency, June 7). Given China's concerns regarding the separatist activities in Xinjiang and Tibet, the Chinese military has expressed interest in learning from their Indian counterparts who have had significant experience in counter-insurgency operations in the Kashmir region and in the northeast. While China and India have viewed each other with suspicion since the 1962 border war, the joint exercise reflects the ongoing efforts by both countries to improve the bilateral relationship. In November 2003, the Chinese and Indian navies conducted joint naval exercises for the first time in the East China Sea, and in April 2005, the two countries forged a "strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity" (*The Hindu*, November 15, 2003; *People's Daily*, April 12, 2005). In spite of these developments, however, the territorial disputes over Arunachal Pradesh and the Ladakh region in the state of Jammu and Kashmir remain unresolved and continue to be a contentious issue between the two countries (*China Brief*, December 19, 2006).

## SARKOZY ACCEPTS INVITATION TO VISIT CHINA

Following his very first meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao on the sidelines of the G8 summit, French President Nicolas Sarkozy announced that he had accepted an invitation to visit China during the latter half of 2007. His visit will be timed to coincide with the announcement of a number of large economic deals between the two countries. During his joint press conference with Hu, Sarkozy stated that he had called upon China to use its influence to pressure Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir to accept the deployment of UN peacekeepers into the Darfur region of Sudan (*The Standard*, June 9). In a previous telephone conversation with Hu, Sarkozy also emphasized the need for China to utilize its growing international influence, saying, “There will be no solution on the question of Iran, on the question of Darfur, on the question of North Korea, without strong and positive Chinese involvement” (AFP, May 23). While Sarkozy has not threatened to boycott the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing in order to pressure China to use its leverage against Khartoum, he is expected to adopt policies that are more critical of China’s trade and human rights practices, unlike those of his predecessor Jacques Chirac.

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## The Death of Huang Ju: Filling the Chinese Leadership Vacuum

By Willy Lam

On the surface, the recent death of Politburo Standing Committee member and First Vice Premier Huang Ju presents President Hu Jintao with an opportunity to further consolidate his power by marginalizing the influence of the rival Shanghai Faction within the Chinese leadership. A former mayor and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Secretary of Shanghai, Huang was rumored to have been involved in business irregularities since the late 1990s and was suspected of corruption. Yet, the Shanghai Faction led by former president Jiang Zemin and Vice President Zeng Qinghong remains influential, as illustrated by the obstacles that Hu and his faction have encountered while trying to widen the anti-graft dragnet in Shanghai in the wake of the September 2006 detention of Chen Liangyu, Huang’s successor as the party secretary of the city.

Eight months after the arrest of Chen for his involvement in the misuse of a multi-billion yuan social security fund,

the pace of the investigation has dwindled. This is despite expectations that the demise of Huang, who had been terminally ill with cancer for the past year, might afford Hu and his allies, Premier Wen Jiabao and Secretary of the Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection (CCDI) Wu Guanzheng, new openings to ensnare more “tigers” from among venal Shanghai Faction affiliates. Political sources in Shanghai say that Huang’s close relatives are on “intimate terms” with both Chen and his associates, who were allowed to utilize the social security fund for various dubious investments. Moreover, what Shanghai insiders call the Huang Ju Clique is believed to have provided backing and “political shelter” to disgraced Shanghai mogul Zhou Zhengyi. A rags-to-riches tycoon, Zhou was first arrested by the CCDI in 2005 for alleged speculation in the stock and real estate markets. Owing to interference by both Jiang and Huang, Zhou was given only a short jail sentence and released in mid-2006. He was re-arrested not long after Chen’s detention (*China Daily*, December 8, 2006). It is understood that since mid-2006, the CCDI has stationed more than 100 agents and investigators in Shanghai. No major breakthroughs, however, have been reported in connection with the corruption rings associated with Chen, Zhou and several Shanghai Faction members.

In contrast, Hu and the CCDI’s Wu have scored impressive victories regarding graft cases outside of Shanghai. One recent example is the surprisingly harsh death sentence that the former director of the State Food and Drug Administration, Zheng Xiaoyu, received last month (*New York Times*, May 29). Given that Zheng was detained three months after Shanghai’s Chen, the CCDI and other related agencies managed to complete investigations into dozens of Zheng’s relatives and affiliates within just six months. Similarly, satisfactory progress has been reported in the clean-government campaign in another directly administered city, Tianjin, where dozens of CCDI agents have been working assiduously since late last year. Early this month, the fast-growing industrial and financial hub was rocked by the supposed suicide of the Chairman of the municipal Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), Song Pingshun. A former police chief who had been apprehended for questioning by the CCDI in early summer, Song is believed to be the overseer of a corruption ring that included Tianjin’s chief prosecutor, Li Baojin. Li, a protégé of Song’s, was arrested last year (*Ming Pao*, June 6; Associated Press, June 8).

Diplomatic sources in Beijing said that after the demise of his 69-year-old protégé, former president Jiang asserted his influence in support of Huang’s family. This has, in effect, prevented the CCDI or other anti-graft bodies from pursuing a host of Shanghai-based suspects. Jiang’s re-assertion of a party elder’s prerogatives has met opposition

in Shanghai, where Huang and his family members are far from popular. It is well known that Huang had allowed his wife to be involved in business long after the CCDI and the Ministry of Supervision had announced regulations forbidding relatives of senior cadres from engaging in commercial activities. Moreover, Huang's daughter, who settled in California in the mid-1990s after marrying into a prominent Taiwanese American family, is said to have helped quite a few of Huang's associates invest in or immigrate to the United States.

The official obituary issued by Xinhua carried *pro forma* eulogies of Huang's contributions to the development of Shanghai. It also noted, however, that the conservative leader played a key role in the unpopular campaign against "bourgeois-liberalization"—a code word for Western ideological concepts—in the mid-1980s (Xinhua, June 5). Moreover, after he became party leader of Shanghai in 1994, Huang became preoccupied with securing his personal interests within the municipal party and government apparatus. Huang also sought to undercut and diminish the authority of his deputy, Shanghai mayor Xu Kuangdi, a capable and well-regarded technocrat who was a protégé of former premier Zhu Rongji's. The Western-trained Xu refused to humor Huang and retired in 2001.

The Hu administration's apparent failure to succeed in the popular anti-corruption campaign has deprived the Fourth Generation leadership of the wherewithal to convince the masses of their ability to deliver a series of pledges laid down soon after their elevation at the 16th CCP Congress in late 2002. Other major promises made by Hu and Wen such as narrowing the divide between the rich and poor as well as bridging the gap between coastal and hinterland China will take much longer to materialize. Last week, the CCDI issued yet another series of regulations that stated that currently serving or recently retired cadres are banned from establishing businesses with associates; are forbidden to free shares of listed companies or other gifts; and are prohibited from seeking employment or other advantages for their relatives (*People's Daily*, June 9). The lackluster performance of the CCDI's "tiger-killing" expedition in Shanghai, however, has tarnished Hu's ambitious campaign to nurture clean governance.

Meanwhile, with little over four months until the 17th CCP Congress, the energy and attention of the leadership is now focused solely on the distribution of coveted slots on the CCP Central Committee, the Politburo and its Standing Committee that will occur during the Congress. The 81-year-old Jiang's continued influence is notably evident in this regard. A source in Beijing familiar with the deliberations within the Shanghai Faction has noted that the former president had held "fairly detailed discussions"

with Hu on personnel changes at the Congress. "As usual, Jiang counseled stability," the source said. "Jiang urged Hu not to bring too many new faces into the nine-member Standing Committee." For this and other reasons, the majority of the nine Standing Committee members are poised to be given new five-year terms. Apart from Hu, Wen and parliamentary chief Wu Bangguo, these nine members include Zeng, 68, and Li Changchun, 63, who holds the ideology and propaganda portfolio that includes media censorship.

Considering that the age of 68 was set as the retirement age for Politburo members at both the 15th and the 16th Party Congresses, Zeng's extended tenure can only be seen as yet another instance in which rules and regulations are being bent to suit the political expediency of the day. Hu and Wen, however, have had difficulty convincing Jiang and other Shanghai Faction stalwarts that Wu Guanzheng, 69, should also be allowed to retain power. Hu had argued that following Zeng's example, the leadership collective should also make an exception for Wu so that the latter would have a few additional years to complete his relatively successful anti-corruption drive. Regarding Li Changchun, the youngest Standing Committee member, the issue is not one of age but of the overall perception that his extremely orthodox approach to ideology and propaganda has stifled the spirit of innovation that Hu and Wen have been trying to foster during the past two years. Li, however, has successfully curried favor with ex-president Jiang, who is lobbying forcefully for him to remain in the Standing Committee.

Perhaps most significant is that President Hu has had difficulty inducting a Fifth Generation representative from within his own faction into the Standing Committee. Since Hu, 65, is expected to retire from the party leadership at the 18th CCP Congress in 2012, the law of succession would dictate that a protégé of Hu's should be installed into the highest policymaking organ as soon as possible. The problem with Hu's younger-generation associates and underlings, however, is that almost none of them has acquired the experience or developed a national stature that is commensurate with Standing Committee membership. For example, the two front-runners to succeed Hu as party chief, the party secretaries of Liaoning and Jiangsu, Li Keqiang and Li Yuanchao, respectively, have failed to distinguish themselves during the past four to five years.

Sources in Beijing stated last week that a compromise might be accomplished between Hu and the Shanghai Faction: that a Hu protégé with enough experience and stature be elevated to the PSC. The name mentioned in this context was the veteran director of the CCP United Front Department, Liu Yandong, 62, who had worked closely

with Hu within the Communist Youth League leadership in the 1980s. Not only is Liu popular and trusted by Hu, but also, after the expected retirement of Vice Premier Wu Yi next spring, she will be the nation's highest-ranking woman. Under this scenario, Liu would assume the position of State Vice President, while incumbent Zeng will take over the chairmanship of the CPPCC. Unlike Hu's younger protégés, Liu is acceptable to most CCP factions. Moreover, there is a consensus among senior political circles that a woman in the Standing Committee will better enable China to fit into the global norm of having additional senior female officials.

The problem for President Hu is that Liu is hardly a rising star of the Fifth Generation. There is also a possibility that, should Hu fail to elevate any of his Fifth Generation protégés to the top this time around, the Shanghai Faction as well as other CCP cliques may settle on somebody else at the 18th Congress in 2012—perhaps a so-called princeling, or the son of a party elder—for the position of the next CCP General Secretary. These intriguing developments reveal that despite the impression given by the official media that Hu is China's undisputed leader, there are serious limitations to his powers. He has been forced to resort to time-honored horse-trading practices with other power blocs in order to move the party forward.

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## China's 2007 Military Training Guidelines and the PLA's Evolving Approach to Military Training

By Michael S. Chase

Until recently, Chinese military training was widely dismissed as infrequent, unrealistic and overly scripted. In the 1980s and 1990s, outside observers and internal critics alike raised doubts about the utility of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) exercises, and it was clear that training deficiencies represented one of the most serious challenges. For example, Western analysts noted that PLA Air Force (PLAAF) pilots flew an insufficient number of hours on a yearly basis and that the limited training they received was unrealistic and heavily scripted. Pilots often relied on strict ground-control intercept (GCI) techniques that granted them little to no opportunity to act on their

own initiative [1]. In recent years, however, the PLA has implemented a series of training reforms, and many units have been engaging in considerably more frequent, realistic and challenging training. Moreover, as part of its reforms, the PLA has begun to employ more rigorous standards of evaluation to improve quality and effectiveness. Although this increased emphasis on establishing realistic exercises is sometimes overshadowed by the deployment of new military hardware, enhancing the quality of military training is an equally important aspect of the PLA's overall transformation. Indeed, recent PLA directives further highlight the need to increase the quality of military training as a critical element of the Chinese military's drive to strengthen its overall operational capabilities.

### CHINA'S 2007 MILITARY TRAINING GUIDELINES

The PLA General Staff Department's (GSD) 2007 Training Guidelines, which were highlighted in the January 12 issue of *Jiefangjun Bao*, reflect the growing emphasis on enhancing training to better prepare the PLA for the challenges it would face in a high-intensity, information-centric conflict against a technologically advanced adversary like the United States [2]. Most importantly, the 2007 GSD Training Guidelines designate "promoting the transformation from military training under mechanized conditions to military training under informatized conditions" (*tuijin jixiehua tiaojianxia junshi xunlian xiang xinxihua tiaojianxia junshi xunlian zhuanbian*) as the main theme (*zhuti*) governing military training. Although many documents issued over the last few years mention the importance of training under "informatized conditions," they do not identify it as the main theme that should guide training. The GSD's 2006 training guidelines, for example, state that the main tasks were using more realistic combat scenarios, standardizing training across the PLA and improving integrated training [3]. The stronger emphasis on implementing "informatized conditions" in the 2007 GSD training guidelines echoes the military training section in China's 2006 defense white paper, which states that the PLA is taking "vigorous steps to accelerate the transition from military training under conditions of mechanization to military training under conditions of informationization" [4].

Beyond elevating "training under informatized conditions" to "main theme" status, the latest training guidelines underscore the PLA's determination to increase the realism of military training, incorporate opposing forces into exercises, conduct more sophisticated joint and integrated training and prepare to operate in a "complex electromagnetic environment" (*fuza dianci huanjing*). The guidelines also discuss improving the skills of commanders and their staffs through various types of exercises. In addition, the 2007 training guidelines underscore the

importance of standardizing examination procedures and making them more stringent.

#### INCREASING THE REALISM AND COMPLEXITY OF TRAINING

In keeping with a theme that has been given a considerable amount of attention in recent years, the 2007 GSD guidelines indicate that training scenarios must approximate actual combat conditions as much as possible. The PRC's 2006 defense white paper also emphasizes the importance of training under realistic circumstances, which helps to "temper troops in a near-real war environment." The Second Artillery reportedly has practiced a variety of techniques to counter enemy ISR, precision strikes and electronic warfare attacks [5]. Since the late 1990s, the Second Artillery has also emphasized inter-theater deployments, which entail considerable operational and logistical challenges. According to one official PLA media report, "Long-distance, inter-theater movement is a test of a unit's ability to maneuver, as well as a test of its combat capabilities" [6]. The PLAAF in recent years also has devoted a considerable amount of attention to conducting night training, alternate base training and more sophisticated exercises involving multiple types of aircraft.

One important way in which many PLA exercises now attempt to enhance the level of realism is by incorporating opposing forces. For instance, according to a January 2007 *Jiefangjun Bao* report, the PLAN recently conducted an opposing forces exercise involving some of China's most modern destroyers [7]. The use of "blue forces" in exercises is a particularly noteworthy development, because it makes training more realistic and challenging, encourages officers to take the initiative in response to changing situations and gives troops exposure to possible adversary tactics. (In the U.S. military, the "red force" represents a potential adversary, whereas in China, the PLA is the "red force" and the opposing force is the "blue force.") Other reports indicate that training is sometimes designed to force participating units to deviate from their plans. This is done to prepare officers and soldiers to cope with actual combat situations in which they may lose the ability to communicate with higher headquarters or find that the enemy has reacted to their actions in unexpected ways. According to a June 2006 *Jiefangjun Bao* article, "The objective of this type of training is to break free of the formulaic training exercise patterns of the past...and temper the ability of the commander and his staff to assess the enemy situation, plan independently, and change their plans as needed" [8].

#### INCREASING THE SOPHISTICATION OF JOINT AND INTEGRATED TRAINING

The PLA is also conducting more joint service exercises as part of the training reforms. In the 1980s and 1990s, many observers assessed that the PLA's joint exercises lacked sophistication and had relatively low standards for declaring that an exercise was "joint." In some cases, such exercises actually involved little more than forces from multiple services training at the same time and in the same general location, but conducting separate exercise scenarios [9]. Similarly, a 1999 U.S. Department of Defense report found that "disparate elements train simultaneously and in proximity, but do not appear to be controlled at the operational level by a joint commander and staff" [10]. According to more recent reports, however, the Chinese military has progressed in this area. Indeed, the PLA has conducted numerous multi-service exercises in recent years, providing considerable opportunities to improve its experience with the conduct of joint operations and joint command and control. For example, in summer 2006, the PLA conducted the North Sword-07 exercise, in which two ground force divisions operated alongside units from the PLAAF, Second Artillery and People's Armed Police [11]. Although there is probably still room for improvement, the consistently heavy emphasis on joint and integrated training in recent documents, including the 2007 GSD Training Directive, clearly reflects the importance that the senior leadership attaches to enhancing the Chinese military's ability to conduct joint operations in an information and electronic warfare environment.

#### TRAINING TO FIGHT IN A COMPLEX ELECTROMAGNETIC ENVIRONMENT

The emphasis on training in a "complex electromagnetic environment" contained in the most recent GSD training guidelines is intended to improve the PLA's ability to operate in an environment pervaded by surveillance, jamming and electronic attacks, and to allow military units to practice various types of counter-reconnaissance, electronic warfare (EW) and counter-EW techniques. Reports in PLA newspapers often mention that this feature is prevalent throughout the services. For instance, according to a May 2007 *Jiefangjun Bao* report, an artillery brigade in the Lanzhou Military Region (MR) conducted training that forced officers and troops to confront the challenges of operating in the type of complex electromagnetic environment that they would likely face in a real conflict (*Jiefangjun Bao*, May 21). Similarly, an October 2006 report highlighted a PLAAF exercise in which pilots had to cope with electronic interference while conducting flight operations at an unidentified training base (*Jiefangjun Bao*, October 2, 2006). The Second Artillery has also conducted

opposing force exercises that stressed electronic warfare training (*Jiefangjun Bao*, August 26, 2006).

#### SIMULATIONS, WAR GAMES, AND COMMAND POST EXERCISES

The latest training guidelines likewise reflect the PLA's determination to continue making greater use of simulations, computer war games and command post exercises to improve the planning and decision-making skills of commanders and their staffs. These techniques are relatively low-cost and allow officers and soldiers to accumulate valuable experience at lower risk than live-fire exercises.

#### IMPLEMENTING STANDARDIZING EXAMINATION AND EVALUATION PROCEDURES

Finally, an overlooked but nevertheless important element of the PLA's training reform program is that the GSD is emphasizing the development and application of more rigorous criteria for the examination and evaluation of military training. This marks a particularly important change, because a more rigorous evaluation of training allows for the military to identify problems and shortcomings and contribute to the development of an accurate appraisal of combat capabilities and readiness.

#### CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Although the PLA is making strides in its training reforms, it continues to face many problems and challenges. For example, the 2007 GSD training guidelines mention that training quality suffers from problems such as units "going through the motions" (*zou guochang*) instead of engaging in rigorous training as well as commanders emphasizing form over substance [12]. This implies that some officers are concerned primarily with the appearance of success, even if it means failing to conduct realistic and rigorous training. Similarly, a recent *Jiefangjun Bao* article lamented that some units did not place a priority on incorporating realistic electronic warfare and jamming conditions into training and exercises, despite its prominence in the most recent annual training directive [13].

Although the numerous articles that address these and other types of problems suggest that the process of transforming PLA training is far from complete, the Chinese military has undoubtedly made progress, and the implemented reforms are helping to prepare it for the challenges of future wars. The PLA's acquisition of advanced military hardware—and increasingly the domestic development of new types of military equipment—are frequently mentioned in media headlines, but improvements in training play an equally important role in increasing the PLA's proficiency in fighting

wars under "informatized conditions." The PLA views the transformation of training as an indispensable part of its overall military modernization program. Chinese military officers recognize that more robust and rigorous training is essential to improving the PLA's operational capabilities. Although many problems remain to be addressed, this impressive transformation has already placed the PLA in a position that would allow it to pose serious tactical, operational and strategic challenges to Taiwan, the United States, Japan and other potential regional adversaries.

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## Sino-Canadian Relations Enter Uncharted Waters

By Wenran Jiang

Only eighteen months ago, China’s relations with Canada seemed to be at their best in history. President Hu Jintao had visited Prime Minister Paul Martin in Ottawa, declaring that a bilateral strategic partnership was established and the two countries would cooperate in a range of areas from energy security to environment to trade and investment. Since the Conservatives ousted the Liberals and formed a minority government in early 2006, however, Sino-Canadian relations have entered a period of uncertainty. While the new government in Ottawa underwent a learning curve in formulating its policy toward China, Beijing has displayed no urgency to adopt any fresh initiatives.

### A WITHERING “STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP”

Under the Liberals, from 1993 to 2006, the Canadian government took active measures to promote engagement with China. Both Prime Ministers Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin pursued closer economic relations with Beijing. The “Team Canada” approach, developed by the Chrétien cabinet with much hope and hype, was first applied to furthering economic and trade relations with China. The idea of provincial premiers and hundreds of Canadian business executives following the prime minister on a mission to Canada’s major trade partners was to

demonstrate a new commitment by the federal government to make Canada more competitive in a globalizing world.

The Liberal government managed to further upgrade Canada’s political relations with China through a number of important phases. In 1997, Beijing optimistically labeled its relationship with Ottawa as a “Trans-century Comprehensive Partnership.” In response to the Chinese initiative, a Canadian Strategic Working Group, centered on the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, but with the participation of other federal and provincial government agencies and China experts across Canada, was created in early 2004. When Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Ottawa in the fall of 2005, the two sides officially elevated the bilateral relationship from “cooperative partnership” to “strategic partnership”—a status reserved for Beijing’s most important and trustworthy international partners.

Both the Chrétien and Martin cabinets also made achieving closer energy ties with Beijing one of their top China policy objectives. Major Canadian missions to China have focused on energy. When Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. completed two CANDU 6 nuclear reactors at Qinshan, outside of Shanghai, on time and within budget, Chrétien went to China to celebrate. A major highlight of Martin’s official visit in January 2005 was the signing of the *Canada-China Statement on Energy: Cooperation in the 21st Century*, which identified three priorities of cooperation in energy and related areas.

The new Conservative government under the leadership of Prime Minister Stephen Harper, however, did not display a high level interest in any of these China policy initiatives implemented by the Liberals in most of 2006. For months, Foreign Minister Peter Mackay did not respond to the Chinese Ambassador’s request for a meeting; the Conservatives criticized China’s human rights record; the annual bilateral governmental human rights dialogue was assessed with little value and suspended, and a senior China policy consultation session did not take place until last October. While Beijing was waiting for Ottawa to adopt a more favorable foreign policy, the Canadian government stopped using the term “strategic partnership” to characterize bilateral relations. In his recent and first visit to China, Foreign Minister Mackay stated that he was seeking a “constructive and comprehensive relationship” with China (*Toronto Star*, April 30).

### THE “RIGHTS VERSUS TRADE” DEBATE

China’s human rights violations, which preoccupied the Canadian public’s perception of China and then-conservative Prime Minister Brian Mulroney’s China policy

in 1989, gradually diminished from being an important factor in Sino-Canadian relations under the leadership of the Liberals. Even under the administration of Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, who emphasized the promotion of human rights, Canada took a subdued approach toward China on its human rights record. The Liberal idea of an engagement strategy with China on human rights was to avoid open confrontation and, instead, to adopt more subtle and indirect means to hopefully influence Chinese behavior.

The Conservatives, during their tenure as the opposition, often clashed with the Liberals and criticized the government's policy of prioritizing trade over human rights. In fact, Canada's China policy has often been a subject of heated debates in the Canadian political discourse. Canadians tend to repeat a familiar "trade versus human rights" debate during the period surrounding a Canada-China bilateral summit. Opposition politicians, editorial pundits and certain NGO groups criticize the government for blindly pursuing economic interests while not substantially condemning human rights violations in China; the government counters such criticism by raising human rights concerns in the summit agenda, and the Chinese accommodate what they see as a formality. Once the high-level meeting is over, most of the contentious issues disappear from the news coverage and little follows in terms of government policies.

When the Conservatives returned to power, however, they signaled a change of course by emphasizing human rights issues. The annual bilateral governmental human rights dialogue, which was celebrated by the Liberals as a major instrument of encouragement, received a critical review as having little impact [1]. While the Conservatives held a series of hearings on China's human rights record in Parliament, the 2006 dialogue did not take place.

What dominated both the media and government agenda on China's human rights for much of the past year was the case of Huseyin Celil (Yu Shanjiang in Chinese), a Canadian citizen of Xinjiang Uyghur origin. Celil had escaped from a Chinese prison in 2000 and later acquired refugee status and Canadian citizenship. He was wanted in China, however, for terrorist and separatist activities. When Celil was arrested by Uzbek authorities and extradited to China in June last year, Beijing refused to recognize his Canadian citizenship on the grounds that Celil was a wanted fugitive who belonged to the East Turkistan Islamic Movement, which is considered by both China and the UN to be a terrorist organization [2]. Denying Canada consular access to Celil, a Chinese court tried Celil in April and sentenced him to life in prison for "terrorist activities and plotting to split the country."

Ottawa seemed to have little influence over Beijing on the Celil case, despite the fact that both Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Foreign Minister Mackay raised the issue with their Chinese counterparts. Beijing's position clearly reflects its deep concern that it does not offer any compromises that could potentially weaken its control over Xinjiang.

The Canadian approach has also sent mixed signals. While the official stance was to obtain consular access, Prime Minister Harper also referred to the Celil case in the context of promoting human rights. On his way to Hanoi last November for the APEC summit, Harper indicated to reporters that he would raise the Celil case with Chinese President Hu Jintao, with whom Canada had requested a meeting on the sidelines. "I think Canadians want us to promote our trade relations worldwide, and we do that, but I don't think Canadians want us to sell out important Canadian values," Harper claimed. "They don't want us to sell that out to the almighty dollar" (CTV, November 16, 2006). Such statements, when expressed in media reports or op-ed pages, may have little effect on China. When it was articulated by the Canadian prime minister, however, Beijing likely interpreted the Conservative government's China policy as supporting the separatist movement in Xinjiang. That perception may have influenced the Chinese decision for Hu Jintao to refuse to meet Harper in a more "formal" setting in Hanoi as it had arranged with other major heads of state. Instead, the Hu-Harper meeting lasted a mere 15 minutes—enough time for only the diplomatic formalities and customary greetings.

In the recent G8 summit in Germany, Hu and Harper again met at the sidelines. This time, there was no media storm or controversy like the one surrounding the last meeting. Yet, the pattern of communication remained more or less the same. Harper, while acknowledging the positive progress China made in the past 25 years, again emphasized the issue of human rights, pressing China to improve its image prior to the 2008 Olympics. He also raised the Celil case again with Hu (*Globe and Mail*, June 9). Hu politely listened to Harper's concerns regarding the human rights issues, did not offer any concrete promises of action on the Celil case.

#### SOME "IRRITATIONS" THAT WON'T GO AWAY

The Harper government, however, has not abandoned trade and economic considerations in its China policy. While most Canadians seem to support the idea that Canada places more emphasis on human rights in its relations with China, there are also growing criticism and pressure for the Conservatives to formulate a more effective China policy that balances both human rights and economic



ties. After struggling through a precipitous learning curve, Canada has, since last fall, begun to send a delegation of its ministers to China to represent the following areas of concern: agriculture, natural resources, international trade, finance and, most recently, foreign affairs. In return, China has sent a number of its deputy ministers to visit Canada, the most recent of which was Minister of Commerce Bo Xilai who visited Ottawa after attending the second U.S.-China strategic economic dialogue. China's powerful National Development and Reform Commission, which is in charge of the country's energy policy, will lead a delegation of top Chinese energy companies to participate in a major Canada-China economic cooperation conference in Edmonton, Alberta next month [3].

Yet, the issues of human rights and trade are only two of the numerous problems that exist between China and Canada. There are, as one Chinese diplomat characterized to this author, other persistent "irritations" in bilateral relations. For instance, Beijing has expressed frustration regarding the fact that China's most wanted fugitive, Lai Changxing, who was accused of embezzling billions of dollars through an elaborate smuggling ring, has been residing in Canada since 1999 and fighting extradition proceedings in the Canadian legal system for the past seven years. There are other suspects of financial crimes who have also taken refuge in Canada and whose lawyers are using China's human rights record and its incomplete legal protection as the first line of defense. There is a widespread perception that China has not carried out its promise to grant Canada the status of "designated tourist country" primarily because Lai has not been sent back to China. At the same time, there is also a growing Chinese perception that Canada is becoming a safe haven for Chinese fugitives.

Another issue, which has been prominently featured in the media and resulted in a major diplomatic row between the Conservative government and Beijing, pertains to national security concerns. Foreign Minister Peter Mackay first mentioned the matter not long after the change of government last year, claiming that the Canadian government was "very concerned about economic espionage" from China. "It is something we want to signal, that we want to address, and to continue to raise with the Chinese at the appropriate time," said MacKay (CTV, April 20). It appears that his concerns were not based on new evidence. Rather, the Chinese spy charges originated in a 2003-2004 report from the Canadian Security and Intelligence Services (CSIS). While not explicitly mentioning China, the report suggested that there could be up to 1,000 Chinese agents and informants operating in Canada for the purposes of collecting economic, scientific and military information, among other secrets.

The Chinese responded strongly, with Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Qin Gang asserting that China had not engaged "in any so-called economic espionage activities in Canada." In addition, Chinese Ambassador to Canada Lu Shumin appeared on CTV, declaring, "There is no Chinese espionage in Canada," and warned, "These kinds of accusations do not help the relationship and are not conducive to the development of this strategic partnership between the two countries." Harper, firmly backing his foreign minister, insisted that Mackay's comments were well-founded. He stated, "We have some concerns with certain activities of the Chinese government in this country and we do intend to raise them at the appropriate time" (CTV, April 20).

Still, in a recent appearance before a Senate committee hearing, the head of CSIS Jim Judd claimed that China is on the top of Canada's anti-espionage operation, with about half of its agency's total resources devoted to China. The charges seem to be wide-ranging, with Harper claiming that Chinese spies stole \$1 billion worth of technological secrets from Canada every month (CP, April 30). Even the Chinese efforts to set up Confucius Institutes around the world are viewed by Canada's spy agency as a national security concern (CP, May 29).

It is obvious that in the span of the past year and a half, Sino-Canada relations have entered a period of uncertainty. While economic ties continue to grow and many fundamental aspects of the bilateral relationship remain sound, policy adjustments on a range of issues are taking place in both capitals. Ottawa is now faced with the challenge of developing a coherent strategy toward China that would allow it to reassert its lost influence and effectively achieve its China policy objectives.

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#### NOTES

1. See Charles Burton, *Assessment of the Canada-China Bilateral Human Rights Dialogue*. Report prepared for the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, available online at <http://spartan.ac.brocku.ca/~cburton/Assessment%20of%20the%20Canada-China%20Bilateral%20Human%20Rights%20Dialogue%2019APR06.pdf>.
2. See Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Jiang Yu's Regular Press Conference on 8 February 2007, <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/fyrth/t296526.htm>.
3. For the details of the visit, see <http://www.china.ualberta.ca/>.

## U.S.-PRC Maritime Cooperation: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?

By Eric A. McVadon

The Pacific Forum-2007, held in Shanghai from May 18-19, was an effort by China to promote maritime cooperation. The international oceanic conference, which the author attended, was sponsored by maritime-oriented universities, interested organizations and the local government, and themed “Harmonious World, Harmonious Ocean.” While saccharine sounding, it purposefully exhibited China’s impressive maritime economic growth, oceanic environmental problems and the newly constructed Yangshan Deepwater Port, potentially the country’s largest such facility. The port, still expanding, is located surprisingly far offshore—southeast of the Pudong area of Shanghai, 30 kilometers away in the East China Sea between two islands and linked to the sprawling new Lingang mainland handling facility by the recently constructed six-lane Donghai Bridge. Concurrent with this major port development, the Jiangnan Shipyard is leaving its historic site on the Huangpu River to make way for the Shanghai Expo 2010 and moving to Changxing Island in the Yangtze River to become the world’s largest shipyard. These latest additions to the spread of Shanghai’s extensive maritime infrastructure not only reflect China’s spiraling economic growth but also are clear indicators of its burgeoning transformation into a maritime nation.

Another superlative aspect of China’s emergence as a maritime power is the stunning surge in the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). While committed to deterring or defeating Taiwan and thwarting U.S. intervention, the PLAN’s focus increasingly represents a more general—and ambitious—goal of attaining the means of projecting power across the sea lines of communication (SLOC) and protecting the ocean commerce on which China’s economy relies. Such an objective explains certain aspects of its modernization, such as the aggressive construction of a new class of nuclear attack submarines (SSNs). The successful development of the SSNs would allow the PLAN to deter would-be disrupters of Chinese energy supplies, the majority of which are transported by sea. Moreover, sea-lane security presents a rationale for the development of an aircraft carrier, a type of ship that would serve only as an easy target in a Taiwan scenario—where China’s land-based airfields are more than sufficient—but would allow for the Chinese military to project its power across maritime regions far beyond the range of land-based aircraft.

Indeed, these developments indicate that China’s senior leaders and strategists are increasingly concerned with traditional and non-traditional threats (e.g. piracy, smuggling, terrorism and other disruptions by non-state actors) to ocean commerce. The recently released U.S. Department of Defense annual report on the *Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2007* confirms the concerns of China’s most senior leaders. The DoD report states: At present, China can neither protect its foreign energy supplies nor the routes on which they travel, including the Straits of Malacca through which some 80 percent of China’s crude oil imports transit – a vulnerability President Hu refers to as the “Malacca Dilemma” [emphasis added by author] [1].

Corroborating this assessment, the vice chairman of a major Chinese security think-tank asserted to this author in April that China is looking beyond Taiwan to sea-lane security missions for the PLAN. He noted, however, that the task is too large for the PLAN and even for the U.S. Navy to undertake alone; cooperative efforts would be required. (This unprecedented statement interestingly implies that the U.S. Navy may not have been relegated to the singular role of a prospective disrupter of oil flow to China.) Aware of U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Michael Mullen’s recent invitation to PLAN Commander Vice Admiral Wu Shengli for China to join the “Thousand-Ship Navy”—a freeform voluntary transnational network of navies—the vice chairman offered two minor caveats with respect to initiating exercises and operations between the two navies [2]: (1) Historic sensitivities favor beginning bilaterally, and then perhaps folding in Japan and South Korea as well as other regional navies; (2) Asking China to cooperate in Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) operations would be a step too far, given Beijing’s concerns about Pyongyang’s reaction.

By and large, the invitation has been well received by the Chinese military, and Admiral Wu expressed interest toward the idea, pending further discussion during Admiral Mullen’s mid-June visit to China (AFP, April 10). A senior PLAN officer well connected to China’s military leadership expressed to this author in late April unreserved support for U.S.-China cooperation in conducting exercises and coping with threats to the security of the SLOCs. A recently retired but also well-informed PLAN officer expressed similar support in April, cautioning only that a wary Beijing may be painfully deliberate in considering participation in more complex exercises and in operational cooperation at sea [3].

Proposals for increased bilateral military relations were again repeated in May when the commander of U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Timothy Keating, visited Beijing and

met with General Guo Boxiong, the senior-most vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission. Admiral Keating stated his desire to increase the quality and level of challenge in U.S.-China military exercises and expand exchanges among lower-ranking troops as quickly and broadly as the Chinese government would allow. General Guo, in response, called for more military exchanges to further promote bilateral ties. In a remarkable exchange during this visit, Admiral Keating said China's interest in developing an aircraft carrier fleet is "understandable." He stressed the difficulty and complexity of developing, building and operating an aircraft carrier, and added that the United States would be willing to help if China decided to proceed with the construction of the carrier (VOA, May 12).

Admiral Keating's offer of assistance attracted attention in the media as well as among the Chinese participants at the Pacific Forum-2007. While the Chinese doubted that the United States would lift arms sanctions imposed after June 1989, they accepted that help not involving weapon technologies was conceivable—possibly conceptual lessons from the U.S. Navy's decades of preeminence as a carrier navy. A respected Chinese security specialist wryly suggested to this author that U.S. "help" might not go any further than a pedantic repetition of Keating's warning about the difficulty and complexities of a carrier acquisition program. Major General Yang Chunchang of the Academy of Military Sciences in Beijing, according to a Hong Kong paper, "was concerned about (the implications of) Keating's remarks," reflecting wariness that help from the U.S. implies prying or even spying [4]. As these reactions illustrate, there is much progress to be made in building trust, but Mullen and Keating have begun the process and drawn attention to the issue.

Other recent developments have received less notice. A symposium at the U.S. Naval War College last December entitled "Maritime Implications of China's Energy Strategy" might have been dominated by assertions that China is grabbing global oil reserves and that competition over energy resources will inevitably lead to a conflict between China and the United States. Instead, the thrust was toward potential cooperation with respect to energy and maritime affairs. Voices in the U.S. Congress have also joined the campaign for cooperation in these areas. As early as late 2005, the co-chairmen of the U.S.-China Working Group in the U.S. House of Representatives advocated, "First, increasing military-to-military ties will correspondingly increase goodwill between our two nations. Second, military-to-military contact will increase our military's understanding of China's military capabilities....As the relationship between the United States and China evolves into the premier international

relationship of the 21st century, many challenges lie ahead. The rise of China is unavoidably intertwined with the future of the United States. For this reason, we must approach the relationship...look[ing] toward interdependence rather than antagonism..." [5].

To thrive, any potential maritime cooperation requires a foundation of improved bilateral relations and broader strategic cooperation between the United States and China and with other regional countries. This has propitiously developed, even if it is largely unappreciated. A quiet but momentous evolution of a new Northeast Asia security framework has occurred, prominently evidenced by the Six-Party Talks. This has been marked by an astonishing change from a significantly adversarial situation where the United States and China were clearly not on the same team—if not openly hostile—to a remarkably better situation where the regional security framework, although not formal or structured, is clearly inclusive of a China no longer seen primarily as an outsider and troublemaker. Moreover, Washington accepts, and even expects, Beijing to play a constructive role on security issues and take the lead where it can be most effective. The foundation on which maritime cooperation can be built is already in place and growing stronger as Beijing and Washington view each other as partners in resolving crucial matters, including North Korea's nuclear status and coping with terrorism.

Meanwhile, the described ongoing modernization of the PLA, although dramatic, must be kept in perspective. One must appreciate that there are concerns in both Beijing and Washington derived from the legitimate need for deterrence and the prospects of hostile actions between their military forces. China views the United States as a potential adversary in a Taiwan scenario—although both sides have compelling reasons for avoiding conflict. Chinese leaders are likewise fearful that the United States seeks to contain China's rise as a great power and suppress its economic growth. From Washington's viewpoint, a more capable PLA is the major military that the U.S. must deter or be able to defeat.

This raises the specter of a highly undesirable outcome. China could turn its back on its longstanding declaratory policies concerning non-expansion and non-aggression and become a threat—where new capabilities and opportunities would translate into belligerent intent. Washington would be seen as having imprudently or unwittingly abetted China's growing and now misdirected global maritime power and military modernization by offering cooperation with U.S. forces. In this scenario, China would move boldly to consolidate territory: Taiwan, the South China Sea and the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands. It could also aggressively extract disputed seabed resources—adding to the list the

Chunxiao oil and gas field in the East China Sea. These fears of an aggressive, hegemonic China are as legitimate as the previously mentioned U.S. need to maintain a fulsome military capability for an armed conflict with China over Taiwan.

Given the potential for conflict, the promotion of mutually beneficial cooperative efforts and fostering of a China that is a responsible stakeholder in a world of maritime cooperation seems to be the logical step forward. Moreover, such a U.S. policy toward China would not diminish the capability of a still vastly superior U.S. force to counter Chinese actions if necessary. Yet, obstacles stand in the way of the advancing of the United States and China as partners on the high seas. While the thirst for energy in China and the United States could potentially lead to an armed conflict between the two countries, it is just as likely, if not more so, that the common need for such security could lead to, and even promote, bilateral cooperation. Such an outcome is indeed possible if both governments establish maritime cooperation as a goal and work diligently and imaginatively to resolve problems and emphasize positive approaches and common interests, as General Guo and Admiral Keating have recently demonstrated.

This maritime cooperation might encompass coordinating governmental policies, consulting about problems and disputes and conducting cooperative naval activities between the PLAN and USN (and other navies as well). One can envision the PLAN joining the U.S. Navy and subsequently other navies, notably the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force, as a partner on the high seas, moving to meaningful exercises and coordinated operations to ensure freedom of navigation and provide enhanced maritime security, to curb piracy, smuggling, terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as to conduct humanitarian assistance—as Beijing wishes it had been better able to do for the tsunami relief operation in 2004 and 2005.

It is possible to envision that in the coming years the commander of the U.S. forces in the Pacific would routinely consult with the PLA Chief of the General Staff on how their forces might react together to an emerging crisis, emergency, natural disaster or need for humanitarian assistance. From the naval perspective—whether called the Thousand-Ship Navy or more prosaically referred to as Sino-American maritime cooperation—the goal should be a new cooperative environment wherein the PLAN and the U.S. Navy, with the enthusiastic approval of their governments, consult, cooperate and operate together to protect ocean commerce, preserve the peace, prevent confrontation and build better relations between what will be the two most important and powerful navies in the

world.

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#### NOTES

1. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, *Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2007*, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2007. p.8
2. See Admiral Michael Mullen, "We Can't Do It Alone," *Honolulu Advertiser*, October 29, 2006, available online at: [http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/mullen/Honolulu\\_Advertiser\\_October\\_29\\_2006.pdf](http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/mullen/Honolulu_Advertiser_October_29_2006.pdf).
3. Based on authors interviews with anonymous PLAN officers.
4. Martin Walker, "Walker's World: China's war chest," UPI, Washington, May 23, 2007, [http://www.upi.com/International\\_Intelligence/Analysis/2007/05/23/walkers\\_world\\_chinas\\_war\\_chest/1042/](http://www.upi.com/International_Intelligence/Analysis/2007/05/23/walkers_world_chinas_war_chest/1042/).
5. Extracted from an essay published by NBR: Congressman Mark Kirk and Rick Larsen, "Congress and the Updating of the U.S.-China Relationship." *NBR Analysis*, volume 16, number 5, December 2005, National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle. Available at <http://www.nbr.org/publications/analysis/pdf/vol16no5.pdf>.

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